Actually has me interested in getting back into the Ethics of Belief literature.

Keith DeRose posts and discusses a new paper of his on the recent experimental work on contextualism and similar views. He attempts to defend the ordinary language basis for contextualism against empirical results purporting to show that people don't get the expected intuitions in the bank cases.

Jonathan Schaffer started getting into the X-phi game a while back. Here is a follow up. He has a draft of a paper that he posted a draft of, and he's looking for feedback.

Eric Schwitzgebel posts chapter seven from his book and solicits feedback. Looks like an interesting chapter to me.

A long time ago I wrote a not particularly good piece on the tautology problem: that natural selection is merely circular definition. I was just out of being an undergraduate when it was published, so it was at best an undergraduate piece. I have been unsatisfied with it ever since. So I will from time to time post on this. To start, what’s the history?

We believe, disbelieve and suspend judgment based on reasons all the time. I think these reasons are best thought of as mental states of the subject. Other people think that they’re best thought of as propositions.
John Turri challenges the latter view. Great discussion in the comments.

In the April edition of Analysis, Hilary Kornblith proposes a reliabilist solution to the bootstrapping problem. I’m going to argue that Kornblith’s proposal, far from solving the bootstrapping problem, in fact makes the problem much harder for the reliabilist to solve. Indeed, I’m going to argue that Kornblith’s considerations give us a way to develop a quick reductio of a certain kind of reliabilism.

I’m directing an independent study this summer on Experimental Philosophy.
We’re starting with the new reader by Knobe and Nichols. I’ll probably be posting about some of it soon.
So far we’re through the manifesto and the section on cross-cultural differences.
We spent most of our time talking about “Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions”

Continuing the theme of Herman’s recent post, with which I’m in broad agreement, here’s a further discussion of intuitions as evidence.
Alvin Goldman writes:

I have some nascent worries about Williamson’s critique of epistemological analyticity in Ch. 4 of The Philosophy of Philosophy (Blackwell, 2007) that I’d appreciate some feedback on.

Sufficiency and decisiveness
It seems from what Williamson says in Section 8 of Ch. 4 that he holds that his Peter and Stephen cases establish not only 1t and 1l, but also something like 2t and 2l:
(1t) Grasping the thought every vixen is a vixen is not sufficient for knowing every vixen is a vixen.