Schroeder discusses a problem with the fact that ethical theories apparently tell us, not only what we ought to do, but why we ought to do it.

On Bloggingheads.tv, Mark Schroeder (USC) and Will Wilkinson talk about Schroeder's book "Slaves of the Passions" which defends a version of the Humean Theory of Reasons

I'll throw one of my own posts into the mix. Here's an argument from some intuitively plausible principles about emotions against a kind of moral skepticism. Not sure what I think about the argument yet, but it seemed worth thinking about.

New paper by Stephen Finlay. To be presented at MEW 2008.

Really exciting new work by Niko Kolodny and John MacFarlane.

Nice paper by Mark Schroeder on reductive naturalism in metaethics (amongst other things).

...when there is no fact of the matter about what would have happened if you had not done what you did. New paper by Caspar Hare. Very interesting.

Geoffrey Sayre-McCord and Will Wilkinson discuss metaethics on bloggingheads.tv. There are lots of good videos featuring philosophers on this site.

It is often said that ‘ought’ is ambiguous in the following kind of way. When one utters ‘A ought to \phi,’ one might mean that A morally ought to \phi, or that A prudentially ought to \phi, or A ‘chessly’ ought to \phi etc