In this post I claim that Williamson’s analysis of epistemic conservatism is based on a mistake. Williamson’s mistake in chapter 7, section 6 of Philosophy of Philosophy (POP) involves including the belief that p among one’s reasons for believing that p.
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Intuitions are Nothing Special, or Are They?
This post looks at Williamson's provocative conclusion that it would be better for philosophy if philosophers did not use the term “intuition” in their theorizing. I argue Williamson has not purchased his conclusion because he has misapplied and altogether missed important distinctions that throw into relief parts of his analysis.
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Intuitions are not Inclinations to Believe
In this post, I propose an argument against Joshua Earlenbaugh and Bernard Molyneux overall thesis in their paper “Intuitions are Inclinations to Believe.”
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The Ethical Werewolf: Moral intuition and linguistic intuition

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Intuitions: Role and Reliability
Shen-yi Laio considers intuition more in response to Weatherson's "Intuition isn’t Unreliable" on the Michigan Grad Students' blog, Go Grue!
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Intuition Isn't Unreliable
Nice discussion about intuitions in philosophy that jumps off from Cummins seminal article. I especially like the argument at the beginning for the conclusion that intuition isn't reliable.
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